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The aim of this paper is to add to the understanding of saving decisions by households. 
The saving behaviour of households is found to differ depending on the birth cohort of the 
household head.  This paper seeks to explain why this pattern might exist.  It is based on 
an analysis of synthetic cohorts derived from unit record data taken from the Household 
Economic Survey (HES) for the March years 1984 to 1998.  The need to use synthetic 
cohorts arises as the HES is not a longitudinal panel survey, but rather a time series of 
independent cross-sectional samples.  We use a range of regression models to separate 
out the effect of age, birth-year cohort and year on saving rates.  The typical saving rates 
for the cohorts born between 1920 and 1939 are found to be significantly lower relative to 
the younger and older cohorts studied.  This pattern of cohort effects is robust to the 
inclusion of conditioning variables; to the trimming from the sample of households with 
either negative or very large ratios of savings to consumption, and to different definitions 
of saving.  Some exploratory investigation supports the hypothesis that changes in the 
economic and policy environment help explain the different saving behaviour of different 
birth cohorts.  Tentative results suggest that more ￿favourable environments￿ are 
associated with lower rates of lifetime saving. 
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Household Saving Behaviour in 
New Zealand: Why do Cohorts 
Behave Differently?  
1 Introduction 
This paper has two major objectives.  The first is to present estimates of the household 
saving patterns for different aged cohorts.  The second is to offer an explanation of why 
saving behaviour might be different for different aged cohorts.   
It is extremely difficult to glean the implications of saving for say retirement income from 
aggregate data on the household sector.  Aside from difficulties of measurement, a low 
overall level of saving in ageing population could be consistent with high saving by those 
in their working years offset by dissaving among an expanding older population of 
retirees.  In short, a better understanding of saving by households requires an analysis of 
micro data based on individual household records. 
This study uses individual records from the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) for a 
15-year period to construct synthetic cohorts (Section 2).  Regression models estimate the 
average saving rates for each five-year birth cohort, after allowing for age and year effects 
together with a set of conditioning variables (Section 3).  Saving rates are found to differ 
markedly across cohorts.  Section 4 presents some tentative findings, which suggest that 
household saving behaviour may well be influenced by economic conditions and social 
policies.  It is argued that the cohort patterns of saving may reflect different conditions 
which faced different cohorts as they moved through their working ages, especially those 
existing during their peak saving years.  Conclusions follow in Section 5. 
The study finds that different cohorts do display different saving patterns.  Those born 
from 1920 to 1939 are found to have significantly lower saving rates than older or younger 
cohorts.  The paper finds that these differences are consistent with the fact that each 
cohort faced a different set of economic and social policies.  The environment that 
prevailed especially during peak earning and saving periods was different for the different 
cohorts.  In particular a more ￿favourable￿ environment that prevailed in the period 1950-
1980 seems to explain why certain cohorts had lower saving rates.  The implication is that 
extent of public provision of social welfare and retirement benefits together with conditions 
in labour markets, do influence the rate at which households will save. 
  




2  Construction of the data and the cohort 
approach 
In this section we first describe the data, and how we have constructed measures of 
saving and synthetic cohorts. We then present a first glimpse of household saving 
patterns based on these cohorts. 
2.1 The  Data 
We have used the income and expenditure data from the HES to estimate saving as a 
residual. We do this fully cognizant of the limitations of the HES.
1
  Our defence rests 
largely on the fact that there is no other source of micro-data for examining household 
saving behaviour.  Moreover, analysts in other countries have used similar data sources, 
particularly the Family Expenditure Survey in the United Kingdom (Attanasio and Banks, 
1998) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey in the United States (Attanasio, 1998).  We 
have tried to eliminate some outliers, and we have a large sample, which might arguably 
compensate for the underlying deficiencies.  But we accept that our results are only as 
good as the survey data from which they are derived.  
The definition of consumption that we have used when deriving the saving rate excludes 
items that are more properly considered as forms of investment and hence are a type of 
saving.  In particular, to obtain the estimate of ￿current￿ consumption expenditure we 
removed from HES total expenditure, expenses on education, life and health insurance, 
purchases of durable goods, medical expenses, repayments of mortgage principal, and 
contributions to savings.  In other words we attempt to construct a measure of 
expenditure, which would result in an "economic￿ view of saving.
2
  Consequently, our 
consumption and saving variables differ from those that may have been available for 
previous studies and from the definitions used for national aggregates. 
The data cover the years 1983-48 to 1997-98.  We refer to these years by the latter year; 
ie, 1984 and 1998. A total sample of 50,624 households was available over these 15 
years. We have removed all observations where household disposable income was 
reported as negative (some 330 households)
3
.  Further we have truncated the sample to 
remove all observations where the age of the household head was reported as less than 
19 or greater than 74 at the time of the survey.  This left us with a sample of 46,269 
households.  
                                                                 
1
 "For several reasons, care is required in making comparisons of expenditure with income from the Household Economic Survey, as 
the method of surveying income and expenditure does not provide for consistency at an individual respondent level....Consequently, 
comparisons of total expenditure against total income are not valid at the household level. It follows that any comparisons of average 
expenditure statistics against average income statistics for groups of households, to estimate savings, for example, could lead to 
spurious results". Background Notes to the Household Economic Survey, Statistics New Zealand (1998), p.17. 
2 For details of the adjustments see Gibson and Scobie (2001). 
3 We recognise that these households might include some self-employed unincorporated businesses, whose business expenditures 
result in negative reported incomes.   




Our justification for restricting the sample to the age range 19-74 is that those less than 19 
were not considered important for studying lifetime saving patterns, while amongst the 
elderly, the HES does not cover institutions so those living in rest homes are not included.  
This means that in the upper age groups we have an incomplete sample based only on 
those living on their own or as part of another household and this group may not be 
representative of the full population of the elderly.
4
 
Rather than taking the ratio of saving to disposable income, we have chosen to follow 
Attanasio (1998) and calculate saving rates by the ratio of saving to consumption.  This 
has the advantage of being defined even when reported disposable income is zero
5
.  
Ideally, a complete accounting for income and saving requires both flow measures and a 
household balance sheet to track stock changes.  The HES provides no measures of the 
stock of household wealth.  As a consequence, any contributions made by an employer to 
a private pension fund are not recorded as saving; and any withdrawals from a pension 
fund are counted as income in the year received rather than ￿dissaving￿.  Fortunately, 




Should the unit of analysis it be the individual or the household?  There is no clear answer 
to this; both have advantages and drawbacks.  The HES reports income for each 
individual in the household, and expenditure on a household-wide basis.  This means that 
to compute saving, one needs to either: 
a.  allocate expenditure to individuals and then subtract from reported incomes to find 
individual saving levels; or 
b.  combine the incomes of individuals to a total household income and subtract 
reported expenditure. 
We have chosen the second option, believing that many saving decisions are taken on a 
household basis, and considering that allocating expenditure to individuals would have 
created some spurious saving estimates, especially for those household members who 
are not participating in the labour force.  It must however be recognised that in multi-
generational households the saving of working age members could be offset by the 
dissaving of younger and elderly members of the same household.  The net saving rate in 
such a household could then differ quite significantly from the saving rates of individual 
members. 
We have defined the age, gender, labour market status and ethnicity of the household 
based on the reported characteristics of the head.  However we also report results based 
on household shares (eg the share who are working, who are male, etc).  
                                                                 
4 Another reason for eliminating the oldest households is that pension income may not be distinguished from other income. Failure to 
recognise the running down of the underlying pension assets will lead overstating saving by the elderly. See Deaton and Paxson 
(2000), who report a more hump shaped pattern of saving with respect to age when flows into and from pension funds are included. 
5 Denote saving by S, consumption expenditure by X and disposable income by YD. Then: 
S/YD =(S/X) .(X/YD); ie, the ratio of saving to income is a monotonic transform of the ratio of saving to consumption and the saving 
ratios reported in this study can be converted by multiplying by the average propensity to consume. 
6 In 1997-98, 6 percent of all households received income from a private pension, and this accounted for just over 1 percent of their 
gross income. A little under one half of the household receiving a pension had a head aged 65-74. Among this group, pensions made 
up 8.5 percent of gross income. 76 percent of these households had no pension income. 
 
  





Table 1 reports the number of observations in each year together with the saving rates at 
the mean, median, 25
th and 75
th percentiles.  The final column reports the ratio of the 
averages of saving to consumption, as distinct from the average (or quantile) of the ratios.  
The mean is clearly influenced by extreme values, so frequently it will be helpful to focus 
on the median saving rate. 
Table 1 ￿ Sample size and saving rates by survey year 















1984  3331 0.376  -0.058 0.227  0.613  0.189 
1985  3295 0.287  -0.106 0.168  0.498  0.139 
1986  3174 0.318  -0.078 0.201  0.551  0.177 
1987  3210 0.341  -0.084 0.209  0.581  0.204 
1988  4021 0.347  -0.043 0.212  0.563  0.200 
1989  3142 0.358  -0.080 0.207  0.601  0.200 
1990  3047 0.313  -0.110 0.188  0.560  0.166 
1991  2674 0.340  -0.099 0.193  0.575  0.227 
1992  2712 0.380  -0.062 0.217  0.609  0.251 
1993  4244 0.415  -0.057 0.222  0.621  0.270 
1994  2839 0.338  -0.096 0.197  0.546  0.235 
1995  2695 0.336  -0.110 0.191  0.607  0.234 
1996  2621 0.355  -0.111 0.186  0.572  0.246 
1997  2642 0.359  -0.091 0.193  0.578  0.259 
1998  2622 0.428  -0.081 0.238  0.676  0.320 
Total  46269 0.353 -0.086  0.202  0.584  0.222 
 
It should be stressed that there is enormous underlying variability in the data. Household 
savings vary between -$1.56 million and +$0.78m. Among any one group with the same rate 
of saving (e.g. 0.20 to 0.29) consumption expenditures vary from $2,950 to $125,474, and 
their absolute level of saving varies from $879 to $32,241. Nearly 32 percent of the sample 
report negative saving. Inevitably some of this may be due to under-reporting of income. 
Evidence from the USA suggests that when the differential under-reporting of both income 
and consumption is allowed for, up to one third of the apparent fall in the saving rate 
between 1972-73 and 1983-84 may be due to misreporting (Bosworth, Burtless and 
Sabelhaus (1991)). 
2.2  The Use of Synthetic Cohorts 
To study the lifecycle profiles of saving we would ideally have panel data, where the same 
people are tracked over time.  However, the available panel surveys in New Zealand are 
restricted to cohorts of young people who were born in the 1970s, and so are unsuitable 
for studying lifecycle phenomena.
7
  But the availability of a time-series of cross-sectional 
Household Economic Surveys allows us to construct synthetic panels following methods 
described by Shorrocks (1975) and Deaton (1985)  
                                                                 
7 The ￿snapshot￿ offered by a single cross-section is also unsuitable for observing life-cycle patterns because although a variety of 
ages are observed in a cross-section, they also represent different birth cohorts. If there are strong cohort effects, a cross-section age 
profile may be very different from the age profile of any individual, as noted by Shorrocks (1975).  




The key idea with synthetic panels is to divide the sample into groups whose membership 
is assumed to be fixed over time.  The average behaviour of these groups is then tracked 
over time and as long as the sample is continually representative of the population that 
has fixed composition, estimates from these synthetic panel data should be consistent 
with estimates from genuine panel data on individuals.
8
 
In the context of saving behaviour, the synthetic panel method requires that we form 
various cohorts defined by date of birth and then follow them across the successive 
Household Economic Surveys. Provided the population is not much affected by migration, 
and provided that a particular cohort is not so old that its members are dying in significant 
numbers, each successive survey lets us track movements in the average behaviour of 
each cohort over time (Deaton, 1997).  For example, we can potentially look at the 
average saving rate of people who are 30-years old in the 1985 survey and connect that 
to the average saving rate of those who are 31-years old in the 1986 survey because both 
averages refer to the cohort born in 1955.  Not only may these averages have many of the 
properties of panel data, they may also avoid some of the problems. 
In particular cohort data are constructed from fresh samples each year, so problems of 
sample attrition should be less severe, and there may be less bias due to measurement 
error because we are typically working with a cohort average (or some other quantile), 
which should reduce the impact of idiosyncratic variability that is a feature of data on 
individuals. 
However, there are at least three practical problems with the use of synthetic panels for 
studying saving behaviour in the Household Economic Survey.  The first is that we do not 
have data on individual consumption (and hence saving) so we can only follow 
households, whose cohort is defined by the date of birth of the household head.  Hence, 
we face problems of household dissolution and reformation, where, for example, older 
people go to live with their children, so that previously ￿old￿ households become ￿young￿ 
households in subsequent years.  There is no practical way to deal with this problem, 
given the nature of the data at hand, but we do attempt some sensitivity analyses based 
on ￿individual￿ measures of saving.  
The second problem is that the assumption that the membership of the group is fixed may 
sometimes be hard to maintain.  For example, if mortality and wealth are negatively 
related, cohort averages will reflect the fact that the population from which the samples 
are drawn becomes progressively richer as the poorer individuals die younger (Attanasio 
and Banks, 1998).  This second problem is related to the first, because rather than dying, 
the poorer elderly also may be absorbed into younger households.  We attempt to deal 
with this problem by restricting the maximum age in our sample to 74 years, although the 
possibility that wealth-related mortality has begun earlier than this age cannot be 
discounted. 
The third problem is that the overall sample size of the HES (approximately 3500 
households per year) means that many of the cell averages would represent rather small 
samples if they are formed from the interaction of each birth-year with each survey year.  
These small cell sizes may impair the precision of any estimates formed using the 
synthetic panel techniques.  We respond to this sample size problem by using five-year 
birth intervals.  
                                                                 
8 Verbecek and Nijman (1992) note that treating averages of cohorts as if they were from genuine panel data may result in inconsistent 
estimates if the unobservable individual fixed effects are correlated with the explanatory variables. However provided that the true 
means in each cohort exhibit sufficient time variation and the cohort sizes are sufficiently large (they suggest 100 to 200) then the bias 
arising from ignoring this errors-in-variables problem is likely to be quite small.  




Table 2 contains details of the five-year birth-interval cohorts, including the birth years, the 
ages observed and the average cell size.  Some of the earliest and latest born cohorts are 
tracked across fewer of the survey years because otherwise the age of these household 
heads would fall outside the range 19-74 years during the 1984-98 period.
9
  The table also 
contains estimates of the average saving-to-consumption ratio for each cohort, the same 
ratios calculated at the median, 25
th and 75
th percentiles and the ratio of average savings 
to average is clear that this pattern combines both age and birth cohort effects because 
the ages over which household heads are observed also vary when moving from one 
cohort to another. 
Table 2 ￿ Cohort definitions, cell sizes and saving rates 





















1910-14 70-74  116 581  0.497  0.002  0.317  0.802  0.311 
1915-19 65-74  174 1,743  0.431  -0.037 0.241 0.674  0.263 
1920-24 60-74  201 3,009  0.426  -0.069 0.235 0.657  0.267 
1925-29 55-73  235 3,518  0.396  -0.083 0.216 0.647  0.253 
1930-34 50-68  224 3,361  0.405  -0.076 0.242 0.631  0.266 
1935-39 45-63  222 3,324  0.449  -0.051 0.265 0.711  0.277 
1940-44 40-58  270 4,047  0.474  -0.053 0.251 0.701  0.304 
1945-49 35-53  330 4,955  0.383  -0.070 0.221 0.600  0.257 
1950-54 30-48  375 5,624  0.322  -0.112 0.187 0.559  0.196 
1955-59 25-43  382 5,726  0.277  -0.103 0.162 0.507  0.164 
1960-64 20-38  362 5,437  0.261  -0.103 0.158 0.470  0.164 
1965-69 19-33  206 3,087  0.254  -0.097 0.167 0.495  0.173 
1970-74 19-28  155 1,553  0.260  -0.099 0.168 0.521  0.194 
1975-79 19-23  61 304  0.156  -0.236  0.030  0.392  0.033 
All cohorts  19-74  257 46269  0.353  -0.086 0.202 0.584  0.222 
One way to hold age constant so that any cohort effect can be observed is to focus on the 
ages where adjacent cohorts overlap.  To do this, each cohort￿s ￿age￿ is based on the 
median year of birth within the five-year birth interval.
10
  Because the cohorts are defined 
by a five-year interval and we have 15 years of data, each cohort potentially overlaps at 
ten ages with the next one.
11
  
Table 3 contains estimates of the mean and median saving rate for each pair of adjacent 
cohorts, averaged over the ages in which the two cohorts overlap.  For both the mean and 
the median, the first four rows of the table, corresponding to households whose heads are 
born between 1910 and 1934, show a negative cohort effect.  Each later born cohort has 
a lower average saving rate than the earlier born cohort had at the same age.  This 
pattern is reversed when moving from Cohort 5 (household heads born in 1930-34) 
through to Cohort 11 (born in 1960-64) as each later born cohort has a higher average 
saving rate than did the earlier born cohort at the same age.  This preliminary view of the 
raw data suggests that there may well be an important cohort pattern on saving among 
New Zealand households.  However, more formal methods are needed to see if these 
cohort effects persist and are statistically significant once a greater lifecycle age structure 
is imposed on the data, and allowance is made for other conditioning variables.
12
 
                                                                 
9 Specifically, Cohorts 1-3 and 12-14 with birth years 1910-24 and 1965-79. 
10 For example, for Cohort 1, where household heads are born between 1910-14, we treat the year of birth as 1912. 
11 For example, Cohort 6 (born in 1935-39) is observed between (median) ages 47 and 61, while Cohort 7 (born in 1940-44) is 
observed between (median) ages 42 and 56, giving overlapping ages between 47 and 56. However, the earliest and latest born 
cohorts are observed for fewer years and hence have fewer years of overlap. 
12 We undertake such an analysis in Section 4.  




Table 3 ￿ Mean and median saving rates, averages over overlapping ages 




1, 2  72-76  0.463,  0.412  0.293,  0.249 
2, 3  67-76  0.428,  0.396  0.263,  0.222 
3, 4  62-71  0.440,  0.340  0.238,  0.183 
4, 5  57-66  0.428,  0.385  0.248,  0.204 
5, 6  52-61  0.444,  0.502  0.261,  0.291 
6, 7   47-56  0.428,  0.550  0.276,  0.288 
7, 8  42-51  0.426,  0.440  0.238,  0.264 
8, 9  37-46  0.324,  0.368  0.197,  0.231 
9, 10  32-41  0.277,  0.301  0.164,  0.177 
10, 11  27-36  0.250,  0.264  0.154,  0.153 
11, 12  22-31  0.270,  0.266  0.176,  0.180 
12, 13  17-26  0.189,  0.281  0.125,  0.171 
13, 14  17-21  0.291,  0.127  0.162,  0.035 
In addition to comparing the average saving rates across cohorts, we can also track the 
saving rate for each cohort across successive survey years.  To do this, each cohort￿s 
￿age￿ is once again based on the median year of birth within the five-year birth interval.  
Figure 1 plots these saving rates against age for each cohort, with the mean saving rate in 
the top panel and the median saving rate in the bottom panel.  To give an example of how 
these cohorts are tracked, for Cohort 6 who had a median age of 47 in 1984, the 1984 
survey was used to calculate the average saving rate for all households whose head was 
born in 1935-39 and the result is plotted as the first point on the line marked ￿6￿ (with a 
median saving rate of 0.17).  The rest of the line comes from the other surveys, tracking 
those households whose head was born in 1935-39 until they are last observed at 
(median) age 61 in the 1998 survey (with a median saving rate of 0.33). 
The immediate impression from both the mean and median saving rates in Figure 1 is the 
substantial amount of noise in the estimated average saving rates.  Because each point is 
a summary statistic for cells that themselves hold an average of 250 households, the 
great variability in saving behaviour across households is apparent.  But even with the 
noise, there is a ￿hump￿ shape in these graphs, with average saving rates being highest 
from the mid-40￿s until household heads reach their 60￿s.  Any decline in saving rates after 
the peak saving years is more apparent at the median than the mean.  The cohort effects 
can also be seen from the variation in saving rates for different cohorts at the same age 
(i.e., by taking a vertical section anywhere through Figure 1). 
  




 Figure 1 ￿ Household Saving Rates by Five-Year Birth Cohort 
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See Table 2 
  




3  The Model and Results 
According to the lifecycle model, a person saves at one stage of his or her life to consume 
in another period.  Therefore, saving behaviour should differ for different individuals at 
different stages of their lifecycles.  The results shown in Figure 1 are consistent with the 
usual pattern of saving with respect to age.  However, saving behaviour may also evolve 
over time and vary across birth-year cohorts as economies grow and as certain 
fluctuations affect individuals contemporaneously.  In this section we first present the 
basic model (Section 3.1), which when estimated with the aid of some identifying 
structure, makes it possible to distinguish the separate effects of age, cohort and time 
when using data observed over different age intervals for different birth cohorts. The basic 
results are in Section 3.2 while additional variations follow in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. 
3.1  The Basic Model 
The results in the previous section show that there is considerable noise in both the 
estimated age profiles of saving rates and the birth-year cohort effects.  Hence, to see the 
underlying patterns more clearly, more structure may be needed.  One common technique 
in the literature is to replace individual age effects with a fifth-order polynomial in the age 
of the household head.  This will tend to smooth out much of the noise while still being 
sufficiently flexible to capture the shape of the underlying age profile.  This approach can 
also be extended to the cohort effects, replacing them with a fifth-order polynomial in year-
of-birth.
13
  An alternative approach to smoothing out the noise in the cohort effects is to 
use broader cohorts, such as five-year intervals of birth-year.
14
  
In this section we follow the approach of Attanasio (1998) and model the age profile with a 
fifth-order polynomial and the cohort effects with a set of five-year intervals of birth-year, 









t s    = the saving rate for household h, observed in year t and belonging to (five-year) 
birth-cohort c; 
f    = a function representing the fifth-order polynomial in age (a); 
γ    = the coefficient vector capturing the effects of the cohort intercept dummies; 
δ    = a function representing the time effects, dt; and  
ch
t u   = the residual term.  
 
                                                                 
13 See, for example, Jappelli (1999). 
14 See, for example, Attanasio (1998).  




The separate effects of a, c, and a+c which equals t, cannot be identified in equation (3.1) 
and any trends in the data can be arbitrarily attributed to year effects, or a combination of 
age and cohort effects (Deaton, 1997).  
On the other hand, if the year effects are dropped from the model it rules out any 
uncertainty, such as due to macroeconomic shocks that surprise all members of a cohort.  
A less extreme assumption than dropping the year effects is to include them but in a 
normalised form so that they sum to zero and are orthogonal to a time trend.
15
  This is 
equivalent to assuming that all trends in the data can be interpreted as a combination of 
age and cohort effects and are therefore, by definition, predictable.  The time effects then 
reflect additive macroeconomic shocks or the residual influence of non-systematic 
measurement error (Jappelli, 1999).  
3.2  The Initial Results 
The basic results of estimating equation (1) are presented in this section.  In keeping with 
our previous search for robust patterns in the data, this equation is estimated for mean 
saving rates and for three quantiles: the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentiles of the distribution 
of saving-to-expenditure ratios. 
Table 4 reports the estimates from four regressions on the individual household saving 
rates.  The separate intercepts for each five-year birth cohort are reported, along with the 
coefficients on the fifth-order polynomial in the age of the household head.
16
.  In all cases 




                                                                 
15 We have adopted this approach following Deaton (1997, p.126). The reparameterisation that is implied is most clearly seen by 
writing the model in its most general form as: 
 
    
u D D D x s
b a b a + + + =
+ δ γ α
 






















For a full discussion of this see Gibson and Scobie (2001). 
16 To reduce the volume of results, we have not reported the additional 14 coefficients for the survey year effects. 
17 It will be apparent to the reader from the low value of the R2 statistics, that saving rates at the level of individual households are 
explained by much more than just age, cohort and year. However our purpose here is to identify age and particularly cohort effects, 
rather than to estimate a household saving function, per se.  




Table 4 ￿ Cohort effects in individual saving rates, controlling for age and year 
effects 










Cohort 2 (b. 1915-19)  -0.045  -0.007  -0.036  -0.136 
  (1.06) (0.25)  (1.14)  (3.05)** 
Cohort 3 (b. 1920-24)  -0.063  -0.014  -0.051  -0.165 
  (1.41) (0.47)  (1.51)  (3.42)** 
Cohort 4 (b. 1925-29)  -0.122  -0.030  -0.084  -0.225 
  (2.55)* (0.90)  (2.30)*  (4.31)** 
Cohort 5 (b. 1930-34)  -0.142  -0.046  -0.106  -0.279 
  (2.65)** (1.24)  (2.62)**  (4.84)** 
Cohort 6 (b. 1935-39)  -0.066  -0.033  -0.081  -0.190 
  (1.05) (0.83)  (1.85)+  (3.03)** 
Cohort 7 (b. 1940-44)  0.054  -0.021  -0.051  -0.074 
  (0.72) (0.48)  (1.07)  (1.10) 
Cohort 8 (b. 1945-49)  0.106  0.002  -0.004  0.003 
  (1.42) (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04) 
Cohort 9 (b. 1950-54)  0.168  -0.017  0.020  0.102 
  (2.08)* (0.35)  (0.37)  (1.31) 
Cohort 10 (b. 1955-59)  0.198  0.003  0.029  0.121 
  (2.32)* (0.05)  (0.50)  (1.48) 
Cohort 11 (b. 1960-64)  0.223  0.011  0.040  0.122 
  (2.48)* (0.20)  (0.66)  (1.41) 
Cohort 12 (b. 1965-69)  0.245  0.019  0.054  0.178 
  (2.61)** (0.32) (0.84)  (1.93)+ 
Cohort 13 (b. 1970-74)  0.281  0.035  0.074  0.250 
  (2.89)** (0.55) (1.08)  (2.56)* 
Cohort 14 (b. 1975-79)  0.263  -0.081  -0.013  0.211 
  (2.39)* (1.12)  (0.16)  (1.87)+ 
Age 1.332  0.759  0.998  1.644 
  (8.61)** (7.32)**  (8.78)**  (10.04)** 
Age
2  -0.067 -0.038  -0.051  -0.083 
  (8.90)** (7.64)**  (9.29)**  (10.52)** 
Age
3  0.002 0.001  0.001  0.002 
  (9.18)** (7.95)**  (9.76)**  (10.93)** 
Age
4  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (9.35)** (8.21)**  (10.09)**  (11.16)** 
Age
5  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (9.40)** (8.41)**  (10.29)**  (11.21)** 
Constant -10.098  -5.910  -7.390  -12.190 
  (8.18)** (7.10)**  (8.11)**  (9.26)** 
        
R
2  0.0135 0.0042  0.0064  0.0144 
Cohort effects = 0  P < 0.000  P < 0.003  P < 0.000  P < 0.000 
Age effects = 0  P < 0.000  P < 0.000  P < 0.000  P < 0.000 
Year effects = 0  P < 0.001  P < 0.000  P < 0.005  P < 0.000 
Note: Coefficients weighted by population sampling weights. Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses; 
+ significant at 10% level * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. The sample has N=46269 observations. 
Each regression also includes 13 time dummies, whose coefficients are constrained to sum up to zero and to be 
orthogonal to a linear trend. 
The cohort effects in the mean saving rate are reported in the first column of Table 4 and 
follow a somewhat ￿V￿ shaped pattern.  Relative to the reference group, which is 
households headed by someone born in 1910-14, saving rates fall across later born 
cohorts, reaching their lowest point for households headed by someone from the 1930-34 
birth cohort, where the saving rate is 14 percentage points below the reference group.  
Thereafter, the mean saving rate increases monotonically across the more recent cohorts, 
until it peaks amongst those households headed by someone from the 1970-74 birth 
cohort, where it is 28 percentage points above the reference group.  This result carries the 
possible implication that downward trends in aggregate saving rates might be temporary,  




as middle-aged cohorts with low saving rates will eventually be replaced by younger 
cohorts with higher saving rates. 
However, there are fewer grounds for such optimism when considering median saving 
rates, which exhibit the same ￿dip￿ for cohorts born ca. 1925-39 but do not show any 
statistically significant rise in saving rates across the more recently born cohorts.  It 
appears that the results for mean saving rates are being caused mainly by the behaviour 
of households in the upper end of the distribution; at the 25
th percentile there are no 
significant cohort effects, whereas at the 75
th percentile the ￿V￿ shape is accentuated.   
Amongst these households with high saving rates, the results in the final column of Table 
4 show that the saving rate for the 1930-34 birth cohort is 28 percent lower than for the 
1910-14 cohort.  While the cohort effect appears to be largely restricted to the upper end 
of the distribution, it must be stressed that these are the households who contribute the 
bulk of aggregate saving.
18
  It is therefore, important to describe and understand these 
cohort effects if one is to make any inferences about the future path of aggregate savings. 
3.3  Adding Conditioning Variables
19 
To check whether within-cell heterogeneity can explain the marked pattern of cohort 
effects, the regression models are augmented with various conditioning variables, 
controlling for demographics, education, employment, family structure and dwelling 
tenure. For example, one possible cause of the cohort effects in Table 4 is that there are 
differences in family structure across birth-year cohorts due, say, to the impact of 
changing social conditions and welfare policies on the prevalence of sole parenthood. By 
checking to see if the pattern of cohort effects changes when these conditioning variables 
are introduced, we test if the shifts in lifecycle saving profiles can be explained by these 
demographic, education and family structure effects, rather than by pure cohort effects.  
Some of the conditioning variables, such as employment status, are likely to change over 
the lifecycle, whereas others, such as ethnicity and gender obviously remain fixed.  In 
both cases, the conditioning variables are allowed to shift the intercept of the estimated 
age profile of saving but because of the small sample sizes we do not consider interaction 
effects where the shape of the age profile can differ between, say, education groups
20
.  











t s  = the saving rate for household h, observed in year t and belonging to (five-year) 
birth-cohort c;  
ch
t w  = a vector of conditioning variables; and  
ch
t u  = the residual term.  
                                                                 
18 Over the fifteen-year sample period, total household savings were estimated at  $93bn of which $87bn was accounted for by the 
households whose disposable incomes fell in the top three deciles on the income distribution. 
19 This section presents only abbreviated results of the findings of the robustness of the basic model as different sets of conditioning 
variables were added. A complete set is available from the authors on request. 
20 See Attanasio (1998) for an example of interacting education with cohort dummies.  




When the gender and ethnicity
21
 of the household head are included, there is a strong 
effect of gender, with male-headed households having saving rates approximately nine 
percentage points higher; but there is no apparent effect of ethnicity on savings.  The 
addition of these demographic controls did not change the basic pattern of cohort 
intercepts.  As in the previous results (Table 4), households whose head was born ca. 
1925-1939 show lower than average saving rates, while the rise in savings rates for the 
more recently born cohorts is even more apparent than when the demographic controls 
were absent. 
The next model included variables for whether the household head is either employed or 
unemployed, and another variable for whether the head receives self-employment 
income.  In comparison with the reference category, which is households whose head is 
out of the labour force, average saving rates are seven percent lower if the head is 
unemployed and 17 percent higher if the head is working.  The saving rate appears about 
13 percent higher when the household head receives self-employment income.  The 
difference in income levels between the self-employed and other households may be too 
small to explain this large jump in saving rates,
22
 so it may be evidence for theoretical 
arguments that uninsurable income risk, which is likely to be greater for the self-employed, 
raises the level of wealth accumulation (Caballero, 1991).  
The addition of these three employment variables reinforces the basic cohort pattern in 
saving rates that was reported in Table 4, with higher saving rates amongst the later born 
cohorts and lower saving rates amongst the households whose head was born ca.  1920-
1939.  Adding the employment variables also affects the results for the other demographic 
controls, halving the coefficient on gender and producing a significantly positive coefficient 
on ethnicity.  Hence, the lower saving rates of female-headed households are partly 
because of their lower employment rates, while households headed by Maori and Pacific 
Islanders would have higher than average saving rates if their household heads had 
employment probabilities that were the same as the rest of the population.
23
 
Figure 2 plots the cohort intercepts estimated at the mean, median, 25
th and 75
th 
percentiles of the distribution of saving rates, along with the intercepts from the models 
that include conditioning variables.  It is evident that the introduction of controls for within-
cell heterogeneity does not greatly modify the relative magnitude of the cohort dummies, 
tending to cause variation only for the most recently born cohorts.  There is rather more 
variation in the patterns of cohort effects estimated at different points in the distribution, so 
we return to that point below, in considering whether the results are robust to increasingly 
severe trimming of outliers from the estimation sample. 
The other notable feature of Figure 2 is its similarity to results reported by Attanasio 
(1998, Figure 9). For the U.S., Attanasio finds that the household saving rate falls for the 
first four five-year birth-cohorts from 1910-14 to 1925-29, and then rises for each of the 
younger cohorts.  With the exception of the later dating of the turning point in New 
Zealand (the 1930-34 cohort) and the inclusion of cohorts born post-1959, the patterns in 
the two countries are strikingly similar. 
                                                                 
21 Both these are fixed over the lifecycle. 
22 Using all 15 surveys from 1984-98, the average disposable income of households headed by someone receiving self-employment 
income was $41,900 (in December 1993 prices), while the average for other households where the head is employed is $39,600. 
23 One hypothesis, untested in this study, is that because of lower accumulated wealth and more erratic employment history, Maori 
and Pacific Island households do not enjoy the same access to credit, inducing a higher level of savings, other factors constant.  




















































































































Mean + demographic controls
Adding employment controls
Adding dwelling tenure dummies
 
When the basic model of five-year birth-cohorts, is augmented with demographic, 
employment, family type and tenure status variables, we obtain a reasonably robust 
description of the underlying data.  We therefore use the predictions from this model in to 
illustrate the shape of the age profile in median household saving rates and to show how 
that profile has shifted up and down across birth cohorts (Figure 3).  
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The typical age profile for the average saving rate is somewhat hump shaped with a peak 
around age 57 but does not become negative at older ages.  While the hump shape is 
consistent with the lifecycle hypothesis, the apparent increase in the saving rate beyond  




age 70 is not.
24
  The downward shift in the saving profile for earlier born cohorts, up until 
the fifth oldest one, is also apparent (earlier born cohorts are shown by the start and end 
points for their graph occurring at an older age, which is the age at the time of the first 
survey in 1984). 
In Figure 2 the pattern of cohort effects is more apparent at the mean and 75
th percentile 
of the distribution of saving rates than it is at median and 25
th percentile.  The quantile 
regression at the median is based on least absolute deviations of the residuals, rather 
than least squares, and so is less sensitive to the presence of outliers.  To investigate 
whether the pattern of cohort effects is just due to some of the extreme values of saving 
rates that are present in the data various ￿trimmed samples￿ that removed extreme values 
of saving rates were used.  In all cases, the models include the demographic, 
employment, family type and tenure status variables.  The results again showed that the 
median saving rate falls from the earliest born cohorts until those born in 1930-34 and 
then rises across the cohorts born in later years.  Hence, the pattern is the same as for 
the mean saving rates, although the rise in saving rates for the most recently born cohorts 
is not as marked.  
The predictions from this quantile regression model give the smoothed median saving 
rates in Figure 4.  The pattern is similar to that for the mean saving rate, except that 
median saving rates are everywhere lower so that there is negative saving at the start of 
the lifecycle and around age 65, and the downward shifts in the profile when moving from 
later to earlier birth cohorts are smaller. 
Figure 4 ￿ Smoothed median savings rate by Cohort: quantile regression 
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Figure 5 plots the cohort intercepts for each of the models estimated with reduced 
samples and for the model of mean saving rates estimated on the full sample.  Although 
the magnitude of the cohort effects vary as the sample or estimation method is altered, 
the relative ranking of cohorts does not change.  In all cases, saving rates fall from earlier 
to later born cohorts between the 1910-14 and 1930-34 cohorts and then the pattern 
                                                                 
24 The use of a fifth-order polynomial does mean that the smoothed saving rate will exhibit four turning points but the predicted rise in 
the saving rate beyond age 70 does not appear to be a result of over-fitting the data. See Gibson and Scobie (2001) where this same 
feature was evident in the unrestricted estimates of the mean saving rate.   




reverses with later born cohorts exhibiting higher saving rates.  These patterns seem 
sufficiently robust to warrant further investigation. 
















































































































3.4  Alternative Definitions of Saving 
As noted in the introduction, consumption expenditures were adjusted to remove those 
items reasonably viewed as ￿investment￿ so as to give a truer picture of the underlying 
saving rate. In this section, we assess whether the cohort effects that we have found 
previously are sensitive to the re- inclusion of some of these items in the household 
consumption variable. 
The cohort effects estimated under these different definitions of consumption and saving 
are plotted in Figure 6.  These graphs illustrate the robustness of the relative cohort 
effects and especially the location of lower saving rates amongst those born ca. 1925-
1939.  The pattern of cohort effects in Figure 6 is consistent with our other sensitivity 
checks, including trimming the sample (Figure 5) and controlling for within-cell 
heterogeneity (Figure 2).  Hence, we are confident that this lower saving rate for those 
born ca. 1925-1939 is a genuine feature of the saving behaviour of New Zealand 
households rather than just some artefact of the data or of our econometric procedures.  
The remaining task is to explain this cohort pattern of saving rates.  
4  Exploring the Cohort Patterns  
Section 3 reported on the pattern of coefficients for the birth year cohorts.  A range of 
these estimates for different quantiles and with different sets of controls was reported in 
Figure 2.  They display a distinct V-shaped pattern.  In short, saving rates appeared to 
differ significantly for different cohorts.  

















































































































Adding medical, education, insurance
Adding durables
Adding mortgage and contributions
Total Consumption
  
The cohort coefficients are estimated with reference to the 1910-14 birth cohort.  Those 
coefficients for cohorts 3, 4 and 5 are all significantly lower than the reference cohort.  In 
contrast, the coefficients for cohorts 9 through 14 are all significantly greater.  In other 
words, those born from 1920 to the mid-1930s have demonstrably lower lifetime saving 
rates, while those born after 1950 have significantly higher rates of saving.  
At first glance this result may seem surprising.  Anecdotal evidence might have suggested 
that those born in the early inter-war period would have been conditioned by wars and the 
Great Depression, which could have lead to higher saving rates, at the least that part of 
saving driven by a precautionary motive.  In contrast, the post WWII cohorts facing greater 
economic growth and security, together with liberalised financial markets after 1986, might 
have been expected to have displayed greater profligacy, and have had lower, not higher, 
rates of saving. 
While these effects may be responsible for some influence on the estimated coefficients, 
clearly some other forces have operated to override them and produce a ￿V￿ rather than an 
￿inverted-V￿ shaped pattern of saving by birth cohorts.  
It is important to explore further the cohort pattern of saving.  As cohorts with different 
patterns of saving move through their life cycle, they may influence the aggregate pattern 
of saving.  The cohorts with significantly lower saving rates were aged between 45 and 60 
in 1980, and entering their peak saving years.  This is precisely the time that aggregate 
household saving was observed to start declining (Claus and Scobie, 2002). 
Attanasio (1998) finds a similar ￿V-shaped￿ pattern of cohort saving behaviour.  He notes 
that the lower saving rates of the group aged in their 40s and 50s in the 1980s ￿are those 
mainly responsible for the decline in aggregate saving￿because those cohorts were in 
the part of their lifecycle when saving are highest￿ (p.604).  While he adds that even in for 
the USA where the data are much more consistent, it is not possible to precisely match 
the aggregate and micro level data.  Nevertheless, the estimated cohort effects ￿explain a 
substantial part of the decline in the aggregate saving rate￿.  




Attanasio continues, noting that: 
￿The main deficiency of the analysis is its failure to explain why those particular 
cohorts did not save ￿enough￿.  A plausible hypothesis, that I have not tested 
explicitly, is that the negative cohort effects for the middle cohorts are linked to 
increases in social security entitlements that the same cohorts have enjoyed￿ 
(p.604). 
Attanasio (1998) posited that more generous public pensions might have explained the 
different lifetime saving patterns of different cohorts.  If over an individual￿s lifetime there is 
increasingly generous provision by the state for public pensions, it seems entirely 
plausible that this would shape expectations about the level of the publicly subsidised 
pension that one might receive.  Those expectations could then in turn influence an 
individual￿s decisions about the optimal allocation of consumption over their lifetime. 
Knowing (or at least predicting) that there would be a generous state pension to underpin 
consumption levels after retirement may lead to higher consumption prior to retirement 
from a given level of lifetime wealth.  The consequence would be that the lifetime saving 
rate would be lower than in the absence of the public pension scheme, or with a less 
generous scheme.  
If this were the case one would expect to see lower saving rates among those cohorts 
whose expectations were for the receipt of a more generous pension and higher rates 
among those who expected to receive lower real pension payments. 
The impact of the social and economic environment over the lifetime of an individual 
(household) could be called the direct effect.  There is also the indirect effect transmitted 
through family and those close to a person.  These are the values and norms that are 
transmitted to them by their parents and others, and which in turn were formed by the 
conditions prevailing in an earlier time and shaping the values of their parents.  In that 
sense, the behaviour patterns observed at any one time are a function of the prevailing 
climate, the expectations of the future climate, together with the effects of all previous 
environments.  Those in the most immediate past could be expected to have the greatest 
effect, with the impact tailing off the further back we go
25
.  We have not tried to explicitly 
allow for these indirect influences of past conditions, which might shape the behaviour of 
a particular cohort. 
To proceed further with this hypothesis, it is necessary to posit some mechanism of how 
and when expectations are formed.  Clearly this is a complex process, and one that would 
reflect the person￿s perception of their economic and social environment.  In addition, the 
experiences of their parents and that of their childhood could well condition their 
perceptions and the need for saving.  The environment prevailing during their working 
lives will affect their labour market experience and earnings (the ability to save) while the 
provision of social services (health, education, housing, pensions) and welfare (sickness, 
disability, unemployment, family and single mother benefits) will influence the need to 
save. 
Other factors including capital gains on housing, real interest rates, rates of income 
growth, access to credit and life expectancy could all be expected to impinge on the 
decision to allocate income to current or future consumption.  In addition, the desire to 
make bequests may also influence the saving rate. 
                                                                 
25 Counter examples can be found where some traditions are handed on virtually unchanged through many generations.  




In short there are many possible indicators that might affect the decisions of individuals 
with regard to their saving rate.  Some of these will operate throughout their working lives.  
Given that the peak saving years are typically between ages 45 and 60, an individual￿s 
perceptions and expectations during this period, would arguably have a significant 
influence on their saving behaviour. 
Essentially there are two steps in the argument: the first, that different cohorts operated in 
different environments; and the second that these different environments shaped the 




Thomson (1991) documents changes that would support the first of these steps.  He 
argues that over ￿the last 50 years welfare states have been very uneven in the benefits 
they provide for successive generations, that is for people born in different decades￿ (p.1).  
￿The prizes and penalties of living in a welfare state are distributed more on the basis of 
birth date than of need, justice or desert.  In New Zealand the big winners in this have 
been the ￿welfare generation￿ ￿ those born between about 1920 and 1945￿ (1991, p.1).  
Testing these hypotheses is clearly a challenge on at least four counts.  First we have 
little theoretical guidance as to how expectations are formed; in particular what relative 
weight should be assigned to each of the three critical periods: the experience of the 
previous generations particularly parents and grandparents which through norms and 
values could be expected to shape the saving behaviour of a particular cohort; the 
conditions prevailing during their working life and in particular applying during the peak 
saving years; and their expectations throughout their working lives about the level and 
eligibility for state support of retirement income. 
Second, we need long time series, arguably covering the last 70 to 100 years to provide a 
quantitative assessment of the different policy environments enjoyed by different cohorts.  
Third, we only have 14 observations of the ￿dependent￿ variable. ie, the cohort dummies 
that relate lifetime saving behaviour to year of birth
27
, meaning the scope for any statistical 
tests is limited; and fourth, as the working lives and saving periods of the later cohorts 
extend into the future, some forecasts of future conditions will be involved in order to 
compare their behaviour with that of individuals from the older cohorts who are either 
retired or dead.  
In what follows we ￿test￿ the hypotheses in a very elementary way.  Basically we look at a 
series of indicators for which we can obtain at least partial data.  Often we focus only on 
selected years or periods that might be ￿typical or representative￿, or occur at that time of 
peak saving
28
.  In effect we are conducting in a loose manner a non-parametric sign test 
as an initial step.  Are changes in the indicators broadly consistent with the hypothesis 
that the savings patterns of different birth cohorts could have been influenced by the 
economic and social policy environment prevailing at key points in the lifetimes?  The 
objective is to make a preliminary foray to establish whether the patterns of some key 
variables that arguably affect the saving decisions of individuals are consistent with the 
                                                                 
26 We refer to these effects as cohort effects for convenience.  In fact it possible that the effect is really a ￿time￿ effect, so that in the 
absence of certain changes both younger and older cohorts would have behaved similarily.  We are grateful to John Creedy for 
pointing out this difference. 
27 It is true that we could estimate the saving rate models with many more cohort dummies; in fact, potentially one for each birth year of 
all the individuals (or household heads) in the sample, as we have done in Sections 4 and 5. This would span some 80 years. However 
these estimates would tend to be noisy; making it difficult to estimate relationships with the policy variables, which show much less 
year-to-year variance. 
28 Clearly this approach could be enhanced with more continuous time-series data from the 1930s to the present, but that is not an 
insignificant task, and one we assign to the category of ￿future research directions￿.  




hypothesis that the cohort differences reflect the external environment.  In particular, we 
examine both labour market indicators (the ability to save) and some measures of public 
pensions and welfare (affecting the incentive to save). 
Table 5 summarises the working life (assumed to be 40 years from age 20) and the peak 
earning years (assumed to be from ages 45 to 60) for each of the key birth year cohorts 
selected for this section.  The first cohort (1910-14) is the reference cohort in the sense 
that the regression coefficients for cohort presented in Section 3 are referenced to this 
cohort, which has a value of zero.  The lifetime saving rate of the adjoining cohort (1915-
19) is not significantly different.  The next three cohorts covering birth years from 1920 to 
1934 are the group that typically have demonstrated significantly lower lifetime saving 
rates, while the last two (covering 1950 to 1959) are representative of those showing a 
significantly greater level of lifetime saving rate. 
Table 5 ￿ Lifetime patterns for different cohorts 
Cohort Number  Birth years   Saving Rate (a)  Working life  Peak Saving Years 
1 1910-1914  0  (b)  1930-1974  1955-1969 
2 1915-1919  0  (b)  1935-1980  1960-1974 
3 !920  -1924  Negative  1940-1984  1965-1979 
4 1925-1929  Negative  1945-1989  1970-1984 
5 1930-1934  Negative  1950-1994  1975-1990 
9 !950-1954  Positive  1970-2014  1995-2010 
10 1955-1959  Positive  1975-2019  2000-2014 
Notes: Refers to lifetime saving rate relative to the 1910-14 reference group (by definition zero). See pattern of cohort 
dummies in the regressions presented in Section 3. Negative and positive refer to the cohorts that were typically significantly 
lower or higher in their lifetime saving rates. 
In what follows we examine some selected aspects of the economic and social 
environment facing the different cohorts both over their working lives as a whole, and in 
particular during their peak saving years.  The question posed is the following: do those 
indicators vary in a way that is consistent with the observed cohort patterns in saving 
rates?  We would expect to find that the proxies chosen for the economic and social 
environment adopted values less favourable for household saving rates during the critical 
years of the low saving cohorts, while the same indicator should be more favourable in 
years corresponding to the high saving cohorts. 
Because of the magnitude of the task of assembling annual data on a wide range of 
variables in a consistent manner for 70 years, we have chosen to use selected years to 
illustrate the results.  We focus on three cohorts: 1 (born 1910-14), 4 (born 1925-29) and 9 
(born 1950-54), and will refer to these as the reference, early and late cohorts.  Typically 
we will look at the values of the indicator variable prevailing during their peak saving years 
(given in Table 5). 
We start with some key indicators relating to the labour market.  The extent of 
unemployment is a critical factor affecting the expected flow of earnings.  Those cohorts 
facing a lower probability of unemployment would be expected to have less incentive for 
precautionary saving.  The unemployment rates (based on the average of the census 
years) facing the reference and early cohorts were 1.2 and 3.3 percent respectively, while 
based largely on projections the late cohort could face an average of 6 percent
29
. 
Prior to the major reforms of the late 1980￿s, the New Zealand labour markets were 
characterised by central wage fixing, limited flexibility and a high degree of unionisation 
(see Figure 7).  Strong national unions were able to bargain particularly with state sector 
                                                                 
29 Unless otherwise noted, all the values of the economic and social policy variables are taken from various editions of the New 
Zealand Official Yearbook.  




employers (public works, power generation and distribution, the Post Office, forestry and 
railways) and gain job security for their members.
30
  It would seem plausible that the job 
security (at least perceived) which the unions were able to achieve, might have reduced 
the incentive for precautionary saving by their members.  
Figure 7- Union density and membership in New Zealand: 1936-1999 
(Membership: RHS; Density (%) LHS) 
A further important labour market indicator is the rate of participation.
31
  The reference 
group had labour force participation rates of 94 and 35 percent for male and females 
workers. In contrast the early cohort faced 89 and 46 percent.  The significant increase for 
women would be consistent with the lower saving rates of this group.  The late cohort 
could face rates of 85 and 70 percent, suggesting a possible drop in the saving rates in 
future.  
                                                                 
30 This resulted in over-manning and a major down-sizing after the subsequent liberalisation.  We recognise that we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the direction of causality may run from cohorts to union membership; ie, the patterns were generated by cohorts with 
different propensities, values and attitudes moving through the time periods. 
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Those facing expectations of higher future income growth rates might be expected to have 
lower rates of saving.
32
  It is certainly true that real income growth rates (both GDP and 
household disposable incomes) were higher for the early cohort and lower for the later 
(higher saving) cohort. 
Increasingly in New Zealand over the last century the state has assumed the role of 
saving for the household through the provision of subsidised (or free) education and 
health services, social insurance (sickness and unemployment benefits), family support 
(family allowances, capitalisation of family benefits, support to solo mothers) and a 
universal system of retirement income support which is neither means nor asset tested.
33
  
It is to be expected that the incentive for voluntary saving by households would be 
reduced in the presence of these programmes; further, the more generous the 
programmes the greater the disincentive effect
34
.  As a result, we would expect that the 
lower savers faced more and the higher savers faced less generous state subsidies in 
health, education and welfare.  
Much work remains to develop consistent long-term series for health and education 
benefits, making any inferences about changes in these policies too speculative at this 
stage.  As an increasing share of the costs of tertiary education has been shifted from the 
state to individuals over the 1990s, it is to be expected that younger cohorts would have 
more incentive to make provision for their children￿s educational costs.
 35
  This tendency 
would be reinforced by the marked increase in tertiary participation rates. 
Arguably one of the most significant elements of public policy that influence saving 
behaviour is that relating to the provision of public pensions.  Between 1970 and 1979, the 
payment to a married couple under the New Zealand Superannuation Scheme rose by 
over 40 percent in real terms (see Figure 8).  This rise corresponded to the peak saving 
years of the very cohorts that display lower lifetime savings.  During the 1970s when the 
early cohort was at its peak saving period the real weekly pension for a married person 
rose from $135 to over $200 (in constant June 2000 terms).  Over the next decade this fell 
and reached a low of $163 in September 1996.  By June 2000 it had recovered to $174.  
In other words the early cohort faced the prospects of very substantial real increases in 
the state pension, a position that was not subsequently sustained.  This is consistent with 
the early cohort making less retirement provision than the later cohort who face lower real 
pensions and greater uncertainty about their viability. 
Another way to assess the real value of the universal superannuation is to compute the 
pension-to-wage ratio.  This was low to medium for the reference group, was markedly 
higher for the early cohorts (typically over 80 percent for a decade from the late 1970s), 
and lower for the late cohorts (expected to average 65 percent)
36
.  In addition, between 
                                                                 
32 The effect of income growth on the saving of an individual is to be distinguished from the effect of economic growth on aggregate 
saving. Under the simple version of the life-cycle model in which workers save and the retired consume previously accumulated 
assets, an increase in the growth rate which increases the lifetime resources of the young relative to the elderly will unambiguously 
increase the aggregate saving rate. See Deaton and Paxson (2000). 
33 It could be argued that in the absence of these state funded programmes private charities provided much of the social insurance, 
and by so doing had a similar effect on dampening the incentive to save as does state provision. This is undoubtedly true to some 
extent, but we would expect that most people would see the state system as more certain than relying on private charity, eligibility for 
which might have depended on certain behavioural patterns and religious proclivities seen as desirable by the providers. 
34 As an illustration, between 1900 and 1935 the total payments for civil pensions and family allowances rose from $314,000 to 
$4,109,658, which per head of European population corresponded to $0.40 to $2.75. By 1941, all pensions and social security had 
reached over $15 per head (NZOYB, 1939 (p.518) and 1942 (p.506). 
35 To the extent that education is seen as an investment, one might expect ￿saving for the children￿s college education￿, a concept well 
entrenched in the USA become more prevalent in New Zealand. 
36 See Preston (1999).  




1985-86 and 1997-98 an income related surcharge on superannuation was in place, 
affecting up to one third of all recipients.  Not only did this reduce the value of the pension 
to current retirees but it would have created uncertainty about the level of future payments 
and hence encouraged later cohorts to place less reliance on its eventual receipt. 
National survey results from September 1999 indicate that 75 percent of those questioned 
agreed with the statement that they would have to rely entirely on their on efforts to 
ensure a comfortable retirement.  Almost 90 percent felt that there would be significant 
changes to the present arrangements, and 88 percent felt that any future payments would 
be less than today￿s levels.  In fact 52 percent felt there would be no superannuation 
within 20 to 30 years or that it would be only available to the indigent on a social safety net 
basis UMR, 1999). 
New Zealand has created a public superannuation fund to meet part of the future 
government liabilities under the universal pension scheme.  Taxes are now higher than 
are needed to meet current obligations, and will be commensurately lower in the future 
when drawings from the fund meet a part of the costs of the public pension; in fact the 
scheme is best viewed as a tax-smoothing system
37
.  If the costs of higher taxes today are 
offset in present value by higher expected pensions in the future (or greater certainty that 
the present levels will be maintained), then lifetime wealth of an individual would be 
unaltered implying no change in their consumption today.  As a consequence while 
national saving may be unchanged by the introduction of such a scheme, personal saving 
rates could well decline reflecting the effect of tax and transfer programmes rather than 
any underlying change in household consumption and saving behaviour.  Gokhale, 
Kotlikoff and Sabelhaus (1996) conclude that the social security scheme which transferred 
resources from the current young and future generations to the current older ones is a 
principal factor in explaining the post-war decline in US saving rates. 















































































































Source: NZ Treasury 
                                                                 
37 See http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/.  




It has been argued that the universal New Zealand superannuation scheme has had, and 
continues to have, a significant influence on the saving behaviour of households.  In the 
1970￿s, when the scheme was perceived as both more generous and certain, saving rates 
of the cohorts directly affected were markedly lower.  However it is recognised that there 
is still a debate about this response.  
Arguably a pivotal study that examined the effect of public pensions on private saving was 
Feldstein (1974), and subsequently Feldstein (1996).  Based on a life-cycle consumption 
function including a term for social security wealth, Feldstein argued that the presence of 
the US social security scheme significantly lowered the level of personal saving in the 
USA.  However, Meguire (2001) challenges these findings and demonstrates that 
relatively modest changes to the sample period and the definition of the wealth variables 
can reverse the conclusion. 
Accepting for the moment that the USA evidence does support the hypothesis that a 
public pension scheme reduces the level of personal saving, would we expect this to carry 
over to New Zealand?  The US social security system is funded by a payroll tax and the 
benefits are earnings related (although not strictly proportional).  It is arguable that while 
the system has in effect operated as a pay-as-you-go scheme (as distinct from a funded 
scheme), contributors may have perceived the scheme more as an individual retirement 
account.  In that case, the public saving may have been seen as a closer substitute for 
personal saving than the defined benefit system funded from general revenue that 
operates in New Zealand. 
In short, it appears the evidence is mixed.  We would argue however that unit record data 
of the type used in this study are potentially more revealing of the underlying household 
responses than aggregate time series data of the type used by Feldstein.  It is quite 
possible that households in the upper two or three deciles of lifetime income, show no 
response at all to changes in social security wealth.  They discount the public pension as 
either a small share of their retirement income or subject to political uncertainty about 
whether they would eventually be beneficiaries in any event.  When it is recalled that 
these households provide the majority of the total household saving (over 80 percent in 
the case of New Zealand) then it should not be surprising if aggregate data failed to reveal 
any effect of the superannuation scheme on personal saving.  In contrast, for the 50 
percent of the households in the lower income deciles, there may be some response 
toward reduced private saving
38
, but the aggregate effect of this is likely to be quite small.  
In addition to the direct effect of the public pension scheme on the savings of households, 
there is evidence that the US social security scheme has led to lower retirement ages and 
labour force participation among older workers (Venti and Wise (1996) and Lumsdaine 
and Wise (1990)).  We would expect that the New Zealand superannuation system 
especially during the 1970s and 1980s when it became more generous, has played a 
similar role in contributing to some of the observed decline in the labour force participation 
rates of older male workers in New Zealand.  
For many households, saving for housing is an important element of voluntary saving.  If 
there was a significant probability of being allocated a state house at a subsidised loan 
rate with generous conditions for purchase it is likely that the incentive for voluntary saving 
would be commensurately diminished.  In fact, lower savers faced a housing market in 
                                                                 
38 Scobie and Gibson (2003) find that New Zealand superannuation represents the majority of the retirement wealth of the four lowest 
wealth deciles and that if people wish to achieve consumption smoothing over their life time, the presence of NZS implies these people 
have no incentive for any other form of retirement saving.  




which the number of state houses being built was much greater than in later years,
39
 thus 
increasing the probability that a family would get access to a state house on concessional 
terms. 
Added to this, the Family Benefits (Home Ownership) Act 1958 provided the option to 
capitalise a universal child benefit and apply that to equity in a first home.  This would 
have reduced the incentive to save for an initial deposit (although lifetime income would 
not have altered).  However the fact that a certain cash grant was replacing a future 
stream of benefits subject to political risk would suggest that the certainty equivalent of 
the capitalisation scheme would have reduced the incentive to save.  Those born from 
1925 to 1934 would have been in their household formation years when this policy was in 
place.  They correspond to Cohorts 4 and 5 (Table 4) with saving rates significantly below 
those for the reference group.  Finally, low savers who were paying off mortgages in the 
1970s and early 1980s faced negative real interest rates, further reducing the cost of 
housing and permitting consumption levels to be higher than they would have been had 
housing costs taken a greater share of disposable incomes. 
In the past family sizes were larger.  Having more children increases the probability that 
the parents will receive support in retirement for their children.  Reduced family size in 
later years would be consistent with later cohorts being higher savers than the older 
cohorts with larger families.  
Up to this point our consideration of the different saving behaviour of older and younger 
cohorts has focussed largely on the state provided benefits that each could have 
expected.  Of course to meet these costs taxes had to be paid, so a full intergenerational 
accounting requires us to incorporate not only market earnings and state benefits, but 
taxation payments as well.
40
  This has not been attempted here. Thomson (1991) 
compares a prototypical ￿early￿ family (born 1930) with a ￿late￿ family (born 1955) and 
traces their lifetime earnings, taxes and benefits.  He finds that the benefit:tax ratio for the 
so-called early family was 2.3 while the corresponding ratio for the late family was 0.6 to 
0.8 (p.172).  This result is strikingly consistent with the pattern of lifetime saving behaviour 
displayed by different birth cohorts in the present study.  
5 Conclusions   
In this paper we have focussed on the lifetime saving patterns of different cohorts.  We 
have provided robust evidence that people born at different times, all other things being 
held constant, demonstrate different lifetime saving rates.  Throughout we have used a 
definition of saving that removes from current consumption items that provide a flow of 
services over an extended period; ie, we have sought to use an ￿economic￿ approach to 
defining savings.  We examined the effect of different definitions and find that the 
essential cohort differences in saving rates remain.  Furthermore, the cohort patterns 
remain when we included a wide range of conditioning variables to account for within-cell 
heterogeneity. 
There are two reasons why the finding of cohort differences is important.  In the first place, 
it might help to explain the changes in aggregate saving behaviour.  Unfortunately, in the 
case of New Zealand, we cannot carry this too far until we have a better understanding of 
                                                                 
39 For example, in 1949-50, over 20 percent of all new dwellings completed were state houses. 
40 A complete accounting would require tracking of asset holdings and changes in asset values.   




how to reconcile the divergent saving rates from the national accounts and the HES.
41
  
Our results here suggest younger cohorts have higher saving rates than their parents, but 
we are not yet able to link that to the observed decline in aggregate household saving 
rates.  It may hold out some glimmer that saving rates will not continue to decline as 
sharply in the future. 
In the second place, if the different saving behaviour of different cohorts is due in part to 
the economic and social climate prevailing during their lifetimes, and in particular if 
different policies were operative for different cohorts, then we can at least start to better 
understand the impact of social and economic policies on household saving behaviour.  
This should contribute to better being able to predict the effect of policy changes in the 
future. 
It is then logical to ask why birth cohort appears as such a significant determinant of 
saving rates.  We have posited the hypothesis that an individual￿s saving rate is in part a 
reflection of the economic and policy environment prevailing over their working life, and in 
particular applying during their peak saving years between ages 50 and 60.  Certainly 
Thompson (1991) has argued that birth-year alone is an important factor in explaining the 
distribution of the benefits of the welfare state over the past 50 years. 
We argue that individuals would tend to have a lower lifetime saving rate if for example, 
their working life corresponded to a period of low unemployment, greater job security, real 
earnings growth, dual income households, generous welfare benefits and they held 
expectations of an assured state pension.  By comparing the lifetime environments of 
different cohorts one could potentially test this hypothesis.  
We have made some modest progress with this complex task, by looking at some 
indicators of the environment facing different cohorts and finding at least a tentative 
association with the pattern of lifetime saving displayed by those born between 1920 and 
1934 and those born before (1910-14) and after 1950.  We conclude, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, that social welfare policies do seem to matter to the amount people are 
prepared to save.  There is the possibility that, in fact, the policies themselves are 
￿endogenous￿; they reflect the outcomes of the political process which in turn is function of 
other ￿truly￿ exogenous circumstances.  The generation whose working lives commenced 
during the Great Depression and then faced WW II were already 25-40 years old by 1950.  
Typically they had delayed marriage and family formation and had little net wealth.   
Arguably they saw state transfers as one way that would both compensate them and 
substitute for the loss of ￿saving time￿ -and voted for such policies accordingly. 
Because of the nature of the HES we have relied on synthetic cohorts.  This method has 
its limitations.  We do not observe the behaviour of say the currently middle aged when 
they were young, nor the currently old when they were middle aged. As Attanasio (1998) 
points out, when extrapolating the lifecycle profile of each cohort for the ages at which it is 
not observed, it is necessary to use the information on the behaviour of other cohorts to 
impose some structure on the data. 
Ideally, we would like to be able to use the insights about saving behaviour at the 
household level to help explain the aggregate saving trends observed in the national 
income data.
42
  Unfortunately, because of the divergent trends in the two sources we 
clearly cannot use the former to explain the latter.  Eventually, we are confident that the 
insights into individual saving behaviour from the micro data will be useful in explaining 
                                                                 
41  For a comparison of the saving trends in the HES with the national accounts estimates, see Claus and Scobie (2002). 
42 See for example Bosworth, Burtless and Sabelhaus (1991).  




aggregate trends.  But until we have a reconciliation and can explain the divergent series, 
then this task remains in the category of unfinished business. 
While the results of the cohort saving behaviour (Section 3) seem both significant and 
robust, our attempts to provide an explanation (Section 4) are partial and tentative.  This is 
a complex area; the saving rates we observe are the resolution of a set of forces 
encompassing social and cultural norms shaped by the experience of earlier generations, 
economic conditions over the working life, expectations of future incomes, health status 
and life expectancy, and myriad state interventions.  Arguably, the provision of higher 
state benefits, or more certainty would be expected to dampen the incentive for private 
saving.
43
  Our preliminary examination of some snippets of evidence is at least consistent 
with that argument.  Further testing of this relationship awaits the development of long-
term data series for at least the last one hundred years, together with richer models about 
how cultural norms and values together with expectations, blend to shape consumption 
and saving decisions. 
                                                                 
43 Cross-sectionally countries with pay-as-you-go pension schemes funded from general or payroll taxes tend to have lower household 
saving rates. See Samwick (2000).  






Attanasio, O., A Cohort Analysis of Saving Behaviour by U.S. Households. Journal of 
Human Resources 33(3): 575-609, 1998. 
 
Attanasio, O. and J. Banks., Trends in Household Saving: A Tale of Two Countries. 
Working Paper No 98/15, The Institute of Fiscal Studies, London, 1998. 
 
Bosworth, B., G. Burtless and J. Sabelhaus, The decline in saving: evidence from 
household surveys. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 183-256, 1991. 
 
Caballero, R., Earnings Uncertainty and Aggregate Wealth Accumulation. American 
Economic Review 76(3): 676-691, 1991. 
 
Claus, I. and G. Scobie, Saving in New Zealand: Measurement and Trends, Working 
Paper 02/02, New Zealand Treasury, 2002.  
 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/workingpapers/2002/02-2.asp 
 
Deaton, A., Panel Data from Time Series of Cross Sections. Journal of Econometrics 
30(1): 109-126, 1985. 
 
Deaton, A., The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconomic Approach to 
Development Policy, Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1997. 
 
Deaton, A. and C. Paxson, Growth and Saving Among Individuals and Households. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 82(2): 212-225, 2000. 
 
Feldstein, M., Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capital Accumulation. 
Journal of Political Economy 82:905-926, 1974. 
 
Feldstein, M., Social Security and Savings: New Time Series Evidence.   National Tax 
Journal 49:151-163, 1996. 
 
Gibson, J. and G. Scobie, Household Saving Behaviour in New Zealand: A Cohort 
Analysis.  Working Paper 01/18, New Zealand Treasury, 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/workingpapers/2001/01-18.asp 2001. 
 
Gokhale, J., L. Kotlikoff, and J. Sabelhaus, Understanding the Post-war Decline in U.S. 
Saving: A Cohort Analysis. Working Paper 5571, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1996. 
 
Jappelli, T., The Age-wealth Profile and the Life-cycle Hypothesis: A Cohort Analysis with 
a Time Series of Cross-sections of Italian Households. Review of Income and 
Wealth 45(1): 57-75, 1999. 
 
Lumsdaine, R.L. and D.A.Wise, Aging and Labor Force Participation: A Review of 
Trends and Explanations. Working Paper No. 3420, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1990. 
 
Meguire, P., Social Security and Personal Saving: 1971 and Beyond. Paper presented to 
the Annual Conference of the New Zealand Association of Economists, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, June 27-29, 2001. 
 
Preston, D., Retirement Income in New Zealand: the historical context. Wellington: Office 
of the Retirement Commissioner, 1999.  





Rankin, K., New  Zealand￿s Labour Supply in a Long Term Perspective. Proceedings of 
the Sesquicentennial Conference of the New Zealand Association of Economists, 
Auckland August 20-22 : pp. 519-539, 1990. 
 
Shorrocks, A., The Age-wealth Relationship: A Cross-section and Cohort Analysis. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 57(1): 155-163, 1975. 
 
Thomson, D., Selfish Generations?  The Ageing of New Zealand￿s Welfare State 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books), 1991. 
 
UMR Insight Ltd, New Zealand Retirement Income- A Tracking Study. Prepared for The 
Super 2000Taskforce. Wellington, 1999. 
 
Venti, S. and D. Wise, The Wealth of Cohorts: Retirement Saving and the Changing 
Assets of Older Americans. Working Paper 5609. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1996. 
 
Verbecek, M. and T. Nijman, Can Cohort Data be Treated as Genuine Panel Data? 
Empirical Economics 17:9-23, 1992. 
 